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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by
Utah Code Annotated S 78-2-2(3)(J).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS MAY ACCEPT AN APDITUR
AND AN APPEAL NONETHELESS

STANDARD OF REVIEW. This is a question of law, which may be
reviewed without difference to the trial court. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988).

II. WHETHER THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF FILED ITS MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL OR AN APDITUR PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
IS SIGNIFICANT
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This is a question of law, which may be
reviewed without difference to the trial court. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988).

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING THE APDITUR IN THIS CASE

STANDARD OF REVIEW. The trial court's order will be reviewed only
for a manifest abuse of discretion.

Smith v. Shreeve. 551 P.2d

1261 (Utah 1976).
DETERMINATIVE RULE
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is determinative in
this appeal.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises out of a trial court's order
granting plaintiff a new trial if the defendants did not consent
to an additur.

Defendants failed to choose between a new trial

or the additur.

Instead, defendants appealed without a final

order.

The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the prior appeal for

lack of jurisdiction finding the appeal premature.
The trial court's original order stated in pertinent
part:
In assessing such damages, the jury awarded only a
little more than half the medical and other special
damages testified to by the only witnesses on this
point called by the plaintiff.
The jury's assessment of general damages did not
take into account the pain and suffering of plaintiff
to date, nor that attributable to the surgery, as
testified to by Dr. Smith.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the court
grants the plaintiff's motion and directs to the sum of
$15,000 be added to the judgment or if the defendant
refuses such additur, the court grants a new trial of
this matter.
(R. 259).
In order to avoid a new trial, defendants voluntarily elected the
additur.

After acceptance of the additur, defendants appealed.
RELEVANT FACTS
After coming to a complete stop at a stop sign,

defendant Bowles failed to yield the right-of-way and collided
with the plaintiff.

As result of defendant's negligence,

plaintiff suffered various injuries, including a degenerative
disc condition which will require future surgery.
This matter was tried in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, State of Utah, and a Judgment on a Special
2

Verdict was entered on or about June 12, 1992. (R, 2 5 2 ) .
P

u or in the alternative an additur,

which motion was granted on or about July
Because defendants had not responded to the order granting the
new

jested

on or about August

** »

I ia 1 setting for

1992. (R. 262)

Defendants

plaintiff's request for a trial setting, stating that they
i n t e n d e d il
(R.

iippcri I Mic « n \\v\ c o n d i t i o n a l l y granting a new t r i a l .

270).

Defendants gave notice of appeal on or about August 13,
: „=

,

minute entry ordered

defendants 1

choose within thirty days either an additi

new trial on

August 19, 1992

court subsequeri

27 1)

Th

i
- . -

holding that the

trial court was divested of jurisdiction due to the notice;1 u!
appeal on September 29, 1992. (R. 3 0 6 ) .
C):i i o : bober il 3, :i 9 9 2, 1:1 I = 111 « 11 ! \ iiprerne Court dismissed
defendants' first appeal holding that the appeal was premature
and c*

consequence the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.

(R, ~
20, 1992.

t on October
The trial court then ordered the defendants to choose

between the additur or a new trial on October ?.s t 1992*

(R*

31 61 .
Defendants accepted the additur and submitted an
amended judgment on the special verdict reflecting the additur,
which judgment was entered

-ecembei
3

I, I i r.» ,

(I \

i.K>).

Defendants then appealed the judgment they had submitted on
December 13, 1992.

(R. 344).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The plaintiff's argument first asks this court to
reconsider the procedural issues brought up by plaintifffs motion
for summary disposition.

Plaintiff's motion addressed whether

defendants have followed the correct procedure for review of an
order granting a new trial or an additur.

Plaintiff argues that

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure 3, 4, and 5 control the situation.

Plaintiff

incorporates by reference its previous arguments made in her
motion for summary disposition.
Defendants argue that a reservation of right to appeal
was made when defendants submitted the judgment.

That

reservation of right is not reflected in the judgment, nor can a
right of appeal be created when it does not exist.

Most

importantly, defendants have not followed the procedure as
outlined by the rules and the precedent in Utah which states that
if the party wants to review a ruling under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, that party must seek either an
interlocutory appeal (which defendants did not), or go through a
new trial.

Since there is a procedure already established, the

appellate court should not now throw away precedent and the plain
language of the rules in order to allow defendants to succeed in
attempting to reinstate the jury's verdict.
Defendants argue that a party may not file a motion for
4

a new trial prior to the entry of judgment.

In response,

plaintiff asks the court to look at the language of the rule
which sets a deadline, not a window of opportunity.

In addition,

the Rules of Civil Procedure in the State of Utah fall under the
general jurisprudential category of notice pleading, wherein the
parties are to be put on the notice of the other party1s
intention, and not kept within the strict and narrow bounds of
the long gone writ system which proved unjust.

A court's ability

to accept a motion for a new trial prior to the entry of judgment
is certainly not jurisdictional, given the fact that a trial
court obviously has jurisdiction up to the moment it enters
judgment, and even under Rules 59 and 60 the trial court has
jurisdiction for sometime thereafter.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting plaintiff an additur.

A trial court is given great

discretion in amending judgments or granting new trials in that
the trial judge viewed the evidence and the witnesses at the time
of trial, and thus is a better judge of their credibility than
the appellate court can be.

The trial court's order granting the

additur stated specific reasons as to why the additur was
granted.

As the evidence in this case was so one-sided, the

trial court could easily find that the jury's verdict was against
the great weight of evidence.

As to whether a verdict is against

the great weight of evidence may in some circumstances invite
argument.

Such is not the case here.

As stated, the case was

completely one-sided, as many of the medical injuries suffered by
5

plaintiff were established and never rebutted by defendants.
ARGUMENT
I,
DEFENDANTS HAVE MOT FOLLOWED THE
CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL OR AN ADDITUR,
Plaintiff hereby incorporates its argument and citation
to authority submitted in its motion for summary disposition in
this appeal.

In addition to that memorandum, plaintiff wishes to

apprize the court of the following facts.
case appears to be in chaos.
dismissed as being premature.1

Procedurally, this

Defendants' first appeal was
Utah case law has already set

out the correct procedure which defendants should have taken in
this case.2

In discussing orders granting new trials, the

Supreme Court of Utah stated:
If such power is in fact exercised arbitrarily, the proper
redress is either in a petition for interlocutory appeal,
which may be granted in the proper case; or the claimed
error can be preserved for review if necessary upon the
final outcome of the case.
Haslam v. Paulsen, 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964).
Such a case is the one before the court.

Defendants claim that

the trial court exercised its powers under rule 59 of Utah Rules

*In appellant's response to appellee's motion for summary
disposition, appellant found it significant the court did not
hold that a defendant may not appeal the granting of an additur.
The fact is not significant at all, considering that the Utah
Supreme Court did not address the question.
defendants recognized the proper recourse and that through
acceptance of an additur they would waive their right to
challenge it. "If a defendant accepted an additur, he would
waive the right to challenge it or be estopped from challenging
it." (Defendants' response to summary disposition in first
Appeal at 6) (R. 294).
6

of Civil Procedure arbitrarily (or in a abuse of discretion) in
granting the additur.

The proper redress, if error did occur,

would have been an interlocutory appeal or taking a new trial.
The case of Boden v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958)
is most illustrative in this case.

Discussing new trials under

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and additurs and remittiturs, the
court stated:
We are not here concerned with any question as to whether
the disparity in the verdict is so gross as to indicate that
the whole verdict is so fused with passion and prejudice
that it should be entirely set aside. The contention here
is that the verdict is outside limits of what appears
justifiable under the evidence to the extent that it should
not be permitted to stand. In such instances the remedy is
to order a modification of the verdict to bring it within
the evidence; and the adverse party is given the choice of
accepting it or taking a new trial. This alternative does
not infringe upon the right of a trial by jury, because the
party favored by the order has had his trial by jury and is
seeking relief from the inadequacy of the jury verdict, or
the party adversely affected always can choose the new trial
if he so desires.
Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court in Boden gave two examples, one
of remittitur and one of additur.

The court explained:

Example 1: P sues D for $200 for destruction of two horses;
the evidence shows that of the plaintiff's two horses,
valued at $100 each, defendant destroyed only one. The
jury, in disregard of the evidence and the instructions,
nevertheless renders the verdict of $200. There is no
foundation for the verdict and the evidence, and it should
not be permitted to stand. Yet, it would be futile to go
through the formality of granting and having a new trial to
arrive at the correct judgment of $100. In order to avoid
such futility of procedure, courts have adopted the sensible
expedient of ordering the judgment reduced to the amount
justified by the evidence (in such case $100), where the
plaintiff is allowed to accept or take a new trial.
Example 2: Same facts as example 1, except the evidence
shows the defendant destroyed both horses. The jury, in
7

disregard of the evidence and the instructions, renders a
verdict for only $100. For the same reason as stated in
example number 1 above, the court should order the verdict
increased to the correct amount, $200, which the defendant
should be allowed to accept, or take a new trial.
Id. at 829.
Since the defendants in this case had the choice of a new trial
or an interlocutory appeal, and chose not to follow the precedent
laid out in Utah law, they should not be allowed to elect the
additur and now request review of the trial court's order.

The

time for interlocutory appeal is long past,3 and accordingly the
trial court's judgment including the additur should be affirmed
on this basis alone.
Defendants in their brief reach the erroneous
conclusion that the Rules of Appellate Procedure support their
position that an amended judgment incorporating an additur is
appealable.

The court will remember that the Utah Supreme Court

in Boden was construing Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Defendants attach significance to the fact that Rule

4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure distinguishes between
the court granting of motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend a
judgment and a court denying a motion for a new trial under Rule
59.

In this sense, defendants miss the very heart of the trial

3

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) provides:
An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought by
any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the
appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within
20 days after entry of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the
action.
8

court's order below.

The order below granted a new trial unless

the defendant accepted the additur.

By acceptance of the

additur, the trial court most assuredly meant that the defendants
would pay the judgment and the litigation would be put to an end.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 does not address conditional
grants of motions for new trial.

As defendants have recognized,

a motion granting a new trial is not appealable.

(See

Appellant's Brief at 13). Motions granting a new trial
contingent upon an additur are not appealable either.
In such a case as this, where a so called reservation
of right to appeal has been made but is not reflected in the
judgment, such reservation should be given no effect.

The

prominent purpose of an additur or a remittitur, which the court
in Boden obviously recognized, is that when the defendants so
elect they put the litigation to rest.

Defendants have attempted

to avoid such result in this case.
The court in Fairfield v. America Photocopy Equip. Co.,
322 P.2d 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) held that a plaintiff had waived
any right to appeal where he had accepted a remittitur, even
where the plaintiff agreed to the remittitur under protest.

The

court in Fairfield stated:
It is settled that by agreeing to reduce the verdict
and enter a judgment for a lesser amount, a successful
plaintiff waives his right to appeal, even though he
made the remission under protest and the court may have
erroneously found the verdict to be excessive.
Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
Conversely, it should be held that by agreeing to an addition to
9

the verdict and to an entry of judgment of a greater amount, a
defendant waives his right to appeal, even when he accepts the
additur under protest.
In this case, the court correctly found the verdict to
be inadequate and the defendants agreed to an increase, and their
protest is of no effect.

The defendants have waived their right

to appeal.
In sum, given the precedent in Utah found in Haslam and
Boden, the rules as viewed together (Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 59, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, 4, & 5) and
common sense, this court should affirm the judgment as entered,
including the additur.4
II. A PARTY MAY FILE A MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
In defendants' docketing statement they state in a
section designated "Issues Presented by the Appeal:" "Did the
trial court have power to consider plaintiff's request for an
additur or a new trial, which was not served within ten days
4

Although Utah Law is abundantly clear that defendant in
this matter has followed the wrong procedural avenue for redress,
plaintiff concedes that there are not many Utah cases addressing
additurs. Most parties understand the nature of an additur and
therefore do not dispute the matter further after its election.
Accordingly, there is not a large amount of post-judgment
litigation after an additur is accepted.
Procedurally viewed, there is no difference between an
additur or a remittitur in that they are both conditionally
given. The electing party is free to accept the granting of a
new trial instead of making an election. As stated, Utah case
law is clear that if a new trial had been granted
unconditionally, no appeal as of right would exist, and the
defendant in this case would have to wait until a final order was
issued in order to appeal the earlier granting of a new trial.
Haslam v. Paulsen. 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964).
10

after the entry of judgment, as required by Rule 59(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure?1'
4).

(Docketing Statement of Appellant at

Defendants have not addressed this issue at all in their

brief.

Perhaps, this is because they realize they did not raise

this issue below and therefore may not appeal it,5 or that their
position was non-tenable.

Nevertheless, plaintiff will address

the issue as it was brought up in the docketing statement.
The plain language of Rule 59 should control.

Utah

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) provides: MA motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than ten days after the entry of
judgment.11 (emphasis added).

The rule itself says nothing about

whether a motion for a new trial can be served earlier than ten
days after the entry of judgment.

It is clear from the language

of the rule that it establishes, not a window of opportunity in
which a party may make such a motion, but instead a deadline
after which any such motion may not be made.6
5

Banaeter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983).

6

In appellant's response to appellee's motion for summary
disposition appellants state that filing a motion for a new trial
prior to the entry of judgment raises a jurisdictional issue as
to whether a trial court has power to consider a motion.
(Appellant's response to motion for summary disposition at 1).
Appellee has trouble believing that such a contention is raised
in good faith. It appears obvious that until the judgment is
entered, and where no interlocutory appeal has been taken, it is
only the trial court that has jurisdiction. The trial court is
not divested of jurisdiction after the jury returns its verdict.
As rule 59 and 60 clearly establish, a trial court has
jurisdiction over a matter even after a judgment is entered. The
trial court must have jurisdiction prior to the entry of
judgment.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated and based
upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both sets of rules
are established and recognized to effectuate what is commonly
11

Ill, THE TRIAL COURT WAS COMPELLED TO MODIFY THE
VERDICT BECAUSE THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
Defendants in their brief state:
In any event, the trial court made no finding that the
jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice#
nor that the verdict was insufficient to justify the
jury's verdict, nor that the verdict was "against law."
(Brief of Appellant at 16-17).
The trial court is not required to parrot the words of a statute.
The trial court stated that the jury disregarded half of the
evidence as to medical and other special damages, and the trial
court found that the jurors assessment of the general damages did
not take into account the evidence of future pain and suffering
some of which would be precipitated by surgery.

As a result, the

trial court found the jury had misapplied or failed to take into
account proved facts and that the verdict clearly indicated a
disregard for competent evidence.

The order of the court

granting plaintiff an additur or a new trial if defendants did
not accept the additur states in pertinent part:
The matter of liability was directed by the Court. The
issue of causation of plaintiff's injury by defendant
was found by the jury and an award of $12,000 for
specials and $5,000 general damages was made.
The foregoing was based on the court's
instructions that on the finding of causation the jury
known as notice pleading. Under notice pleading, it is
understood that the purpose of pleadings is to give the adverse
party notice as to what actions the other party may want to take.
Clearly, serving a motion before entry of judgment pursuant to
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the adverse
party adequate, in fact more than adequate, notice of what that
party intends to do. The adverse party cannot reasonably argue
that they are prejudiced in any way by a motion being submitted
before the deadline outlined in the statute. (See generally 61A
Am Jur. 2d § 1-3).
12

was to assess damages for the full amount of
plaintiff's injuries although the defendant's
negligence may have aggravated or light up (sic) a
latent, dormant, or a symptomatic condition.
In assessing such damages, the jury awarded only a
little more than half the medical and other special
damages attested to by the only witnesses on this point
called by the plaintiff.
The juror's assessment of general damages did not
take into account the pain and suffering of the
plaintiff to date nor that attributable to the surgery
as testified to by Dr. Smith.
Based on the foregoing considerations the Court
grants the plaintiff's motion and directs that the sum
of $15f000 be added to the judgment or if the defendant
refuses such additur, the Court grants a new trial in
this matter.
(R. 259-260).
This order was clearly within the court's discretion pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) and (6). Rule 59(a)(5) and
(6), the provisions under which this motion was originally made,
provide that a new trial or amended judgment may be granted if
the verdict exhibits:
(5)excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6)insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against the law.7
The Utah Supreme Court in Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d
701 (Utah 1961) stated that a new trial is warranted when:
[T]o the trial judge, "it seems clear that the jury has
misapplied or failed to take into account proved facts:
or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made
findings clearly against the weight of evidence.. . ."
7

The appellant has stated that the court made no findings as
to passion or prejudice. (Appellant's brief at 1). Such a
finding was not required by the court. It is clear under the
rules that the court could have given the plaintiff award of an
additur under 59(a)(6).
13

Id. at 704 (emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court also stated:

Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter
exclusively for the jury and unless such an award
clearly indicates the jury's disregard of competent
evidence. . ., the trial court may not interfere with
the jury's determination.
Battv v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978).
The trial court's order granting a new trial, quoted above, shows
that the trial court found that the jury had misapplied and
failed to take into account proved facts such as evidence of past
and future medical expenses of plaintiff, the past damages which
would be considered special damages, and the pain and suffering
attendant to future surgery which should have been considered
under general damages.8

The court also found that the jury's

verdict exhibited that the jury had misunderstood or disregarded
the law or probably made findings clearly against the great
weight of evidence in that a jury instruction was given and it
was shown that defendant's negligent acts had aggravated or
lighted up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition.

The

trial court's order clearly reflects that it considered the
precedents established by Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
As both defendants' and plaintiff's briefs have
outlined, in order to reverse the trial court, this court must
8

See Dupois v. Nelson. 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981) (When a
damage award indicates a disregard of the evidence by the jury, a
court may entertain a motion for an additur).
14

find that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in
granting the new trial or the additur.

Page v. Utah Home Fire

Ins. Co.. 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964).9

Given the

evidence that was before the trial court, and the deference which
must be given to the trial court in this matter, it cannot be
said that the trial court abused its discretion.
Damages in this case were established by a number of
witnesses.

A Dr. Lyle Jacobs testified as Ms. Terry's treating

physician; Dr. Charles Smith testified as defendants' independent
medical examiner; and Dr. Wing testified as a radiologist who had
only a slight connection to this case; Coral Terry, the
plaintiff, testified herself; Douglas Terry, the plaintiff's
husband, testified as to the changes in plaintiff's life; and
Duane Hutchings, plaintiff's employer, testified as well.

The

plaintiff Coral Terry testified as to her condition prior to the
accident and how the accident has changed her life. (See
generally testimony commencing at R. 702).
Mrs. Terry explained that she experiences pain when driving
and that she often has muscle spasm in her back.

(R. 715). Mrs.

Terry states that she wakes up frequently at night in pain; she

9

The court in Page recognized the broad discretionary power
of the trial court granting or denying motions for new trials, or
remittitur and additur as well established. This discretion is
necessary to allow the court an opportunity to re-examine or
correct jury verdicts or findings which it believes to be in
error, or where there is substantial doubt that the issues were
fairly tried.
See also Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991): Schmidt v. Intermountain Healthcare. Inc.f 635 P.2d
99 (Utah 1981) .
15

noted that this occurs almost every night.

(R. 715- 716). Mrs.

Terry testified that the activities she once loved to engage in
are no longer available to her.

(R. 717). Mrs. Terry testified

that she cannot play with or take care of her grandchildren as
she could before the accident and as she wishes she could now.
(R. 722). When asked why she had not asked the doctor for more
pain medication, or why she had not taken more medication for her
injuries, Mrs. Terry explained that she is a health-conscious
person who does not like taking drugs.

(R. 730). When asked

whether she plans to have surgery, Mrs. Terry explained that
although the medical provider's testimony during the trial had
scared her somewhat concerning potential surgery, she still
intends to have the surgery performed in order to alleviate her
problems.

(R. 774).
Douglas Terry, plaintiff's husband, testified as to the

pain and restrictions which plaintiff currently experiences. Mr.
Terry testified that Mrs. Terry was extremely active before the
accident, but is now extremely limited in what she is able to do.
(R. 766-770).
Duane Hutchings, plaintiff's employer, testified as to
the asymptomatic nature of plaintiff's pre-existing condition.
He noted that plaintiff had not shown any signs of being in
discomfort or pain prior to the accident.

(See generally

testimony of Duane Hutchings commencing at R. 676). Mr.
Hutchings also testified that it is "highly probable" that Coral
Terry lost an estimated $8,000 in lost sales, which can be
16

attributed to the accident because she could not work in her
sales position for long periods of time as a result of the
accident.

(R. 690).
Dr. Lyle Jacobs testified as Mrs. Terry's treating

physician.

Dr. Jacobs is a board certified orthopedic surgeon.

(R. 524). Dr. Jacobs testified that the plaintiff experiences
muscle spasm often and that she has sub-occipital tenderness with
a limited range of motion.

(R. 179). Dr. Jacobs diagnosed the

cause of these symptoms as whiplash.

(R. 180). Dr. Jacobs

diagnosed both a degenerative disc disease in plaintiff's back as
well as posterior midline disc bulging.

(R. 188). Dr. Jacobs

noted a continuation of these symptoms which he felt indicated a
permanent nature.

(R. 190). Dr. Jacobs also noted an arthritic

change in the plaintiff and recommended a fusion and excision
(discectomy) as the proper course of treatment.

(R. 191).

Dr. Jacobs attributed the degeneration of the disc and
the posterior midline disc bulging, as well as the arthritic
change to the accident caused by the defendant.

(R. 192). As a

result, Dr. Jacobs, based on his objective findings and the past
medical history of the patient, gave an impairment rating of 6
percent whole body in this case.

(R. 193).

Dr. Charles Smith testified as an independent medical
examiner.

Dr. Smith was asked to examine plaintiff by defense

counsel in this matter. (R. 588). Dr. Smith noted a restricted
range of motion and a degeneration of the cervical disc.
590).

(R.

Dr. Smith found that any pre-existing condition which may
17

have existed was asymptomatic prior to the accident.

(R. 598).

Dr. Smith found what he considered to be a 10 percent impairment
of Mrs. Terry which could be attributed solely to the accident
herein litigated.

(R. 598; R. 650). Dr. Smith noted a

disability in plaintiff in that she had suffered a functional
loss.

(R. 599). Dr. Smith stated that this disability arose out

of the accident.

(R. 600).

Since Dr. Smith was called as an independent medical
examiner by the defendants, he reviewed the accident report and
all records which he might have indicated a pre-existing
condition.

(R. 600). However, his opinion based on these

records and findings was that the pre-existing condition was
asymptomatic and that the current symptoms which plaintiff was
suffering were caused by the accident at issue herein.

(R. 601).

Dr. Smith stated "She will be stuck with a substantial amount of
residual,"
601).

and that she most likely would require surgery.

(R.

Specifically, Dr. Smith indicated that she would need a

fusion and discectomy.

(R. 603).

The surgery will be both painful and expensive.
Defendants' IME, Dr. Smith, estimated that therapy would last at
least five months.

(R. 607). Dr. Smith estimated the surgery

would cost at least $2,000.00.

(R. 609). Anesthesia for the

surgery could cost as much as $1,000.00.
to the surgery would cost $600.00.

(R. 609). X-rays prior

(R. 609). The plaintiff will

be required to wear braces after the surgery and these will cost
in the neighborhood of $150.00.

(R. 610).
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The therapy required will consist of approximately
three to five visits per week for six weeks.

Dr. Smith indicated

the plaintiff may need to go everyday, and that each session
would cost up to $50.00 per session.

(R. 610).

The hospital stay arising out of the surgery will cost
anywhere from $4,500 to $15,000.

(R. 613). Accordingly, Dr.

Smith's testimony indicated that the future surgery alone could
cost from $10,000 to $20,000.

It is this evidence the trial

court felt the jury had ignored and failed to apply.10
In addition to those costs cited above for future
surgery, Dr. Smith also indicated that the plaintiff will need
household help for six months.

(R. 611). Dr. Smith also

anticipated that plaintiff would lose wages in that plaintiff
would not be able to work from six to eight weeks, and for that
period would only be allowed to work part-time for an additional
six to eight weeks.

(R. 614).

Dr. Smith again stated in his testimony, after relating
the costs of the injuries, that he believed the surgery was
necessary and that the need for the surgery arose out of the
accident herein litigated.

(R. 616). Evidence was also

submitted that the plaintiff was currently using a neurostimulator which had been given her by defendants' independent
examiner.

Dr. Smith's testimony was that the package of

instruments needed for this neuro-stimulator cost approximately
10

The trial court specifically found that the jury's award of
general damages did not reflect any compensation for future pain
and suffering.
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$3,000.00.

(R. 617).

Dr. Smith felt that much of the plaintiff's pain came
from the irritation of the greater occipital nerve.

(R. 635).

Dr. Smith opined that it was more likely than not that plaintiff
would get the surgery.

(R. 643). Dr. Smith specifically stated

that the degenerative disc disease was not from simple aging, but
from trauma induced by the accident herein litigated.

(R. 654).

The only medical provider called by the defendants was
Dr. Wing, a radiologist.

Dr. Wing stated that he had never seen

the plaintiff or examined her.
looked at x-rays.

(R. 667). He stated that he only

(R. 667). Dr. Wing substantiated previous

testimony stating that plaintiff does have an abnormality in the
disc and a degenerative condition.

(R. 667). While Dr. Wing

could not name a cause for these conditions, he said that it was
possible for other practitioners to arrive at such a conclusion.
(R. 670). Dr. Wing related that the x-ray taken in February of
1989 which he reviewed did reveal what could be muscle spasm.
(R. 674). Dr. Wing compared that February 1989 x-ray with a 1991
MRI, but came to no conclusive analysis.

Dr. Wing stated that he

could not make a comparative analysis between the 1989 x-ray and
the 1991 MRI because such a comparison would be "fraught with
error."

(R. 675). Certainly a comparison that is fraught with

error does not rise to the level of a reasonable medical
certainty which is required for expert medical testimony.

Other

than the facts cited above, Dr. Wing did not refute any of the
other doctors' testimony as to damages.
20

Under Utah law, damages must be awarded for preexisting
condition that is aggravated by a subsequent accident.
v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Biswell

The evidence in

this case is that the plaintiff had a preexisting injury to her
back, but that injury was asymptomatic and that the accident in
this case lighted up and aggravated that injury.

Both Dr. Smith,

defendants' own IME, and Dr. Jacobs testified as to damages and
future costs the plaintiff would incur.

Both stated the

plaintiff's alleged preexisting condition, if there was any, was
asymptomatic.

The evidence was conclusive that plaintiff's

condition was attributed to the accident sued upon, and that 100
percent of her disability was caused thereby.
Defendants did not rebut this evidence.

Defendant

William C. Bowles had nothing to offer as far as evidence of
damages are concerned.
In sum, Dr. Smith, defendants' own IME, estimated that
the future costs of surgery could be as much as $20,000,
exclusive of necessary costs for household assistance after
surgery.

The future damages also should include the

rehabilitation time off work.

There was an undisputed $4,000 in

medical expenses incurred to the date of trial.

The special

damages that were undisputed at trial, both past and those that
would be necessarily incurred in the future, exceeded $28,000
with an additional, somewhat disputed amount of $8,000 loss of
profit.

In candor, plaintiff would concede that the $8,000 was

raised by defendants on cross-examination, but was not
21

significantly rebutted.

Therefore, special damages as proved by

the weight of evidence totaled over $36#000.
There is also uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Smith and
Dr. Jacobs on permanent impairment, which is completely objective
based on loss of actual function.

The corresponding disability

is supported by the testimony of Dr. Smith as well as the
testimony of plaintiff, her husband, Mr. Terry, and her employer,
Mr. Hutchings.

The court's order granting an additur took into

account that the jury must have misapprehended this objective
evidence.
The future surgery which will be required is a cervical
discectomy/fusion which will result in very significant pain and
suffering regardless of the possible stoic nature of the patient.
All of this evidence was substantially uncontroverted,
substantially objective, and apparently disregarded by the jury.
The trial court recognized that there was little, if any,
evidence supporting defendants' theory of the case.

Because the

evidence was so one-sided, and the jury did not base its verdict
on the evidence presented or the applicable law, the trial court
granted a new trial.

The trial court reasonably concluded that

the jury misapplied or failed to take into account the proven
facts, or misapplied or disregarded the law, and on this basis
granted an additur which should be sustained.
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
This court has the power to grant the plaintiff
damages, specifically attorney's fees, pursuant to Utah Rule of
22

Appellant Procedure 33. Both this appeal and defendants' prior
appeal would come under the definition of frivolous appeals as
they are not warranted by existing law.

The Appellate Court

should note that no attorney's fees or costs were provided in the
previous appeal which was dismissed as being premature.

Utah

Rule of Civil Procedure 11 also provides a basis for recovery of
attorney's fees in this case, as a reasonable inquiry would have
shown that no basis for this appeal exists.

Defendants have

never argued for an extension of current law.
Defendants earlier appeal in this matter attacking the
trial court's granting of a new trial or an additur was similarly
dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court.

Defendants have accepted

the benefit of avoiding a new trial by accepting the additur
while at the same time trying to contest the very order by which
the benefit was conferred.

These two appeals combined have

incurred a great expense on the plaintiff as well as a general
delay in receiving the judgment she is due.
Because the plaintiff has been forced to respond to
these appeals, the plaintiff should be entitled to both costs and
attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Defendants have not followed the correct procedure for
review of an order conditionally granting a new trial in that
they have not followed the correct appellate procedure or the
correct precedent in Utah which establishes that defendants
should have filed an interlocutory appeal, which they did not, or
23

accept a new trial.
It is clear from the language of Rule 59 of Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure that a party may file a motion for a new trial
prior to entry of judgment.

The rule establishes a deadline and

not a window of opportunity.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting an additur or a new trial where it found that the jury
had disregarded large amounts of evidence and misapplied the laws
of Utah.

Accordingly/ plaintiff would ask this court to sustain

the additur and the entry of judgment reflecting that additur.
DATED AND SIGNED this /"-~

day of «afreh^ 1993.

FFERY>cr.
IVIE^ST
YOUNG
uk-sr YOU

Attorneys for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ajjpeal with postage prepaid thereon this
day of Maiteh, '1993/ to the following:
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq.
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt LaXe City, Utah 84111

Secretary ^Z)
9190J13
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Coral Terry,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
William C. Bowles, an individual,
and US West Communications,
dba Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company,
Defendants and Appellants.
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ADDENDUM
A.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59

B.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3

C.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4

D.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5

E.

Order Granting a Conditional New Trial

F.

Dismissal

G.

Amended Judgment Reflecting Additur

of Appellants' First Appeal

ADDENDUM A

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgmentCD Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from .having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the triaL
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

ADDENDUM B

Rule 3. Appeal as of right how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal foam all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the courtfromwhich the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket An appeal shall be docketed
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.

ADDENDUM C

Rule 4. Appeal as of right when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of rightfromthe trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.

ADDENDUM D

Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the action.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied,
the filing fee shall be refunded.
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain:
(1) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the controlling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed;
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon;
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal
should be permitted; and
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance
the termination of the litigation.
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of
law and opinion.
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered.
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms,
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for
appeals from final judgments.

ADDENDUM E

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL* DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

CORAL TERRY,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case Number:

910400402

RULING
GEORGE E. BALLIF, SENIOR JUDGE

WILLIAM C. BOWLES,
Defendant.
**********

This matter i s before the Court on the p l a i n t i f f ' s

motion

for an a d d i t u r e or in the a l t e r n a t i v e , a new t r i a l .
The matter of l i a b i l i t y was directed by t h e Court.

The

i s s u e of causation of p l a i n t i f f ' s injury by the defendant was

}

found by t h e jury and an award of $12,000.00 for s p e c i a l s and
$ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 general damages was made.
The foregoing was based on the Court's i n s t r u c t i o n s

that

on t h e finding of causation the j u r y was to assess damages for the
f u l l amount of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s although the defendants
n e g l i g e n c e may have aggravated or l i g h t up a l a t e n t , dormant, or
asymptomatic condition.
In assessing such damages t h e jury awarded only l i t t l e
more t h a n half the medical and o t h e r special damages t e s t i f i e d
by t h e only witnesses on t h i s p o i n t called by the p l a i n t i f f .
The jurors assessment of general damages did not t a k e

to

i n t o a c c o u n t the p a i n and s u f f e r i n g of p l a i n t i f f
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the s u r g e r y ,

to d a t e , nor t h a t

as t e s t i f i e d t o by Dr. S m i t h .

Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h e C o u r t g r a n t s
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s motion and d i r e c t s t h a t t h e sum of $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 be
a d d e d t o t h e judgment o r i f defendant r e f u s e s such a d d i t u r e ,
C o u r t g r a n t s a new t r i a l of t h i s matte*Dated t h i s 2.-' day of J u l y , 1992.
BY THE COURT

cc:

R. P h i l I v i e , Esq.
F l o y d Jensen, Esq.

the

ADDENDUM F

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
October 1 3 ,

84114

1992

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
J e f f e r y C. P e a t r o s s
IVIE & YOUNG
48 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y Avenue
P . O . Box 672
P r o v o , UT 84603

Coral

Terry,
Plaintiff

and A p p e l l e e ,
v.
W i l l i a m C. B o w l e s , an i n d i v i d u a l ,
and US West Communications, dba
M o u n t a i n S t a t e s T e l e p h o n e and
T e l e g r a p h Company,
D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s .

No. 920387
910400402

P l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n f o r summary d i s m i s s a l i s t h i s day
granted.
I n i t i a l l y , defendants did n o t respond to the
g r a n t i n g o f t h e a d d i t u r , b u t o b j e c t e d and a p p e a l e d when
p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t s had
not responded.
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g , g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s
u n t i l S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 9 2 , t o respond was p r o p e r i n r e p o n s e t o
p l a i n t i f f ' s motion w h i c h l e f t t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h t r i a l
court.
T h i s a p p e a l i s t h e r e f o r e p r e m a t u r e , and t h i s c o u r t
lacks jurisdiction.
Geoffrey J.
Clerk

Butler

ADDENDUM G

FLOYD A. JENSEN, Bar #1672
Attorney for Defendants
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-7418
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MCKRL4ED
CORAL TERRY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

AMENDED JUDGMENT ON
SPECIAL VERDICT, WITH
ADDITUR

vs.
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an individual,
and U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
dba MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY,

Civil No. 910400402
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants and Appellants.

The above entitled action having come before the Court for trial on the 26th,
27th and 28th days of May, 1932. The plaintiff having been represented by Jeffery
C. Peatross, IVTE & YOUNG, and defendants having been represented by Floyd
Jensen, testimony having been taken and argument of counsel having been
heard, the jury returned a special verdict as follows:
"1.
Was the negligence of defendant, Bowles, in the January 30, 1989,
accident a -proximate cause of plaintiff, Coral Terry's injuries?
Yes X
No
"2.
If your answer to the above question is yes, proceed to answer
question number 3. If your answer is no, so indicate and sign and return this
Special Verdict to the court.
"3.

What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Coral Terry, for the

lljO±>±t

damages, if any, which she sustained as a result of the incident:
a

A.

U

B.

For special damages

$ 12.000

For general damages

$ 5.000*

Based on the foregoing verdict, on June 12, 1992, the Court (Ballif, J.)
entered a Judgment on Special Verdict in the amount of "SEVENTEEN
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000) with interest to be included on special damages
of $12,000 from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per
annum, together with costs in the amount of $53°.QO

to assessed pursuant to

Rule 54 U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure/
On J u l y 23, 1992, pursuant to and granting Plaintiffs Request for an
Additur or a New Trial, filed June 2, 1992, the Court (Ballif, Ret. J.) entered its
ruling granting an additur in the amount of $15,000, or if Defendants refused
such additur, a new trial.
Defendants having timely filed their Acceptance of Additur dated November
10, 1992, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($32,000) with interest to be included on special damages of $12,000
from the date of the loss until entry ofjudgment at the rate of 8% per annum,
together with costs in the amount of $

, to be assessed pursuant

to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. _
DATED AND SIGNED this >
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